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NEVER IN A VACUUM: LEARNING FROM THE THAI FIGHT
AGAINST HIV
INTRODUCTION
More so than any other widespread health threat in the twen-
tieth century, the emergence and dissemination of HIV/AIDS caught
the attention of much of the world and scared it out of its wits. Initial
reports, often sensational, fostered a lingering association of the virus
with the homosexual1 and intravenous-drug-using communities.2
Long after this premise had lost whatever truth it may once have
had, deeply ingrained stereotypes 3 stood in the way of the kind of con-
certed action that such a health threat demanded.4 This phenomenon
1. Efforts to use frightening stories about AIDS as tools to vilify the gay community
began in the early days of the virus and have often been wildly misinformed:
Much was made in the early years of the epidemic of a so-called 'Patient
Zero' who was the basis of a complex "transmission scenario" compiled by
Dr. William Darrow and colleagues at the Centre for Disease Control in the
US. This epidemiological study showed how 'Patient O' (mistakenly identified
in the press as 'Patient Zero) had given HIV to multiple partners, who then
in turn transmitted it to others and rapidly spread the virus to locations all
over the world. A journalist, Randy Shilts, subsequently wrote an article
based on Darrow's findings, which named Patient Zero as a gay Canadian
flight attendant called Gaetan Dugas. For several years, Dugas was vilified
as a 'mass spreader' of HIV and the original source of the HIV epidemic
among gay men. However, four years after the publication of Shilts' article,
Dr. Darrow repudiated his study, admitting its methods were flawed and
that Shilts' [sic] had misrepresented its conclusions.
AVERT, The Origins of HIV & the First Cases of AIDS, http://www.avert.orglorigins.htm
(last visited Jan. 27, 2007).
2. In Thailand, for example, during the early and mid eighties:
[G]ay men, sex workers, injecting drug users and tourists were more com-
monly affected than other groups. The government took some basic measures
to deal with the issue, but an epidemic was not yet apparent. Most of these
measures were aimed at high-risk groups, as the government believed that
there was not yet sufficient reason to carry out prevention campaigns among
the general public.
AVERT, HIV & AIDS in Thailand, http://www.avert.org/aidsthai.htm (last visited Feb. 28,
2007) (citations omitted).
3. Dr. Harold Jaffe of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) remembers that "[w]hen
it began turning up in children and transfusion recipients, that was a turning point in
terms of public perception. Up until then it was entirely a gay epidemic, and it was easy
for the average person to say 'So what?' Now everyone could relate." AVERT, The History
of AIDS up to 1986, http://www.avert.org/his8l_86.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
4. "Although heterosexual sex is now the main means of transmission in most com-
munities, stereotypes and stigma often remain attached to men who have sex with men.
They are still 'blamed' for HIV/AIDS in many instances." ELDIS, Gender and HIV/AIDS:
Stereotypes, http://www.eldis.org/gender/dossiers/responses.stereotypes-men.htm (last
visited Feb. 28, 2007).
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(initial indifference, followed by panic, followed by belated action)5
was a global one and has played out in parts of the developing world
much as it did in the industrialized nations.6
Thailand's experience with HIV/AIDS is instructive because it
involves many of the topics that have been identified as central to
understanding how the virus spreads.7 To understand the story of
HIV in Thailand is to understand both how a complex web of cultur-
ally specific ideas and practices regarding the disease have operated
to create an epidemiologist's potential nightmare scenario,' and how
a resource-poor developing nation managed to take an effective stand
against what sometimes seems like an infectious juggernaut.9 The
pertinence of the Thai case has, therefore, been broadly recognized. °
5. The example of the United States's response is instructive in this regard. CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV AND AIDS - UNITED STATES, 1981-2000, June 1, 2001,
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5021a2.htm. Following the identifi-
cation of the first United States case in June 1981, the federal government did not imple-
ment universal distribution of HIV prevention funds to health departments until 1985.
The first nationwide public awareness campaign, including school educational programs,
did not take shape until 1987. Id.
6. In South Africa, for example, although the first case of HIV was documented in
1982, the government's initial reaction was slow. AVERT, HIV & AIDS in South Africa,
http://www.avert.org/aidssouthafrica.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007). The AIDS Advisory
Committee was not created until 1985, and antenatal HIV testing did not take place until
1990. Id.
7. See Annette Hamilton, Primal Dream: Masculinism, Sin, and Salvation in
Thailand's Sex Trade, in SITES OFDESIRE, ECONOMIES OF PLEASURE: SEXUALITIESINASIA
AND THE PACIFIC 145, 147-48 (Lenore Manderson & Margaret Jolly eds., 1997). For the
Centers for Disease Control's explanation of how HIV is transmitted, see CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL, HIVAND ITS TRANSMISSION (1999), http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/
factsheets/PDF/transmission.pdf.
8. The high rates at which Thai men have traditionally patronized prostitutes, when
combined with low rates of condom use in these encounters, made Thailand especially vul-
nerable for an HIV epidemic. See infra Part II for a discussion of the evolution of the sex
industry in its modern form and the unique problems it presented for the anti-HIV effort.
9. See Chris Beyrer, The Regional Impact of HIV and AIDS, 24 WASH. Q. 211, 211
(2001).
10. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 7.
The global HIV/AIDS crisis has prompted foreign scholars to recognize the
importance of Thai sexual practices and the prevalence of commercial sexual
relations. As in Africa, the pattern of rapid spread of infection through mul-
tiple channels, notably heterosexual intercourse, has made Thailand an im-
portant site for examining the relations between cultural, social, and economic
parameters implicated in the spread of the disease. Some of these are only
now beginning to be understood: for example, the organization of the trade
in girls, which spreads far beyond the boundaries of the country; the atti-
tudes to commercial sex among young males in the provinces; attitudes to
prostitution in the context of mother-daughter relations; responses to the
anti-HIV/AIDS public education campaign; and Buddhist accounts of AIDS
and attitudes towards homosexuality.
Id. at 147-48 (citations omitted).
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Part I of this note examines the emergence of and early attitudes
towards HIV in Thailand. Part II is devoted to the commercial sex
industry in Thailand, which has played a central role in the spread
of the disease and has been made the primary focus of the govern-
ment's prevention and education efforts to date. Part III charts the
aggressive response of the Thai government, led by its Ministry of
Health, to the HIV threat it recognized as being so immediate. The
implications for the prevention program of the 1997 Southeast Asian
economic crash, which originated in Thailand and spread throughout
the region, are considered in Part IV. Part V explores the possibility
that the government's anti-HIV strategy no longer focuses on the
right social behaviors and examines some alternate plans for up-
dating the program. Part V also attempts to draw some useful lessons
from the Thai battle against HIV and to see which elements of the
program proved most successful. This section further examines
whether and how these lessons can now be transplanted for use in
other countries forced to contend with the spread of the disease.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE THREAT
The story of HIV/AIDS in Thailand began not long after the
disease was first isolated and identified." In September of 1984 the
country's first case appeared: "a homosexual Thai male who had
previously lived in the United States."'2 The Thai Ministry of Public
Health took notice and mandated nation wide reporting of the disease
the following year. 13 As was common throughout the world in the
1980s,"4 the Thai perception in the early stages of the epidemic was
that HIV/AIDS was a disease largely confined to the homosexual and
intravenous-drug-using populations.' 5 In 1989, however, the Health
11. The CDC issued the first warning about what later proved to be AIDS on June
5, 1981. Kaiser Family Foundation, GLOBAL HIV/AIDS TIMELINE (Aug. 16, 2006), http:I
www.kff.org/hivaids/timeline/hivtimeline.cfm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
12. Tarik Abdel-Monem, Affixing Blame: Ideologies of HIV/AIDS in Thailand, 4 SAN
DIEGO INT'L LAW J. 381, 383 (2003).
13. Id. As will be discussed later, the vigilance and proactive approach taken by the
Ministry of Public Health (especially notable in comparison with other countries in the
region) had much to do with Thailand's ability to arrest the spread of the disease to the
extent that it did. See infra Part III.
14. See ELDIS, supra note 4.
15. David Plummer & Doug Porter, The Use and Misuse of Epidemiological Categories,
in No PLACE FOR BORDERS: THE HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC AND DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC 41, 41-43 (Godfrey Linge & Doug Porter eds., 1997). The authors argue that the
persistent conflation of HIV/AIDS with homosexuality (itself a concept that often defies
cross-cultural analysis) slowed the response of the global scientific and political commu-
nities to the emergence of the disease. Id. Although "the risk category 'homosexual' is
generally (but unjustifiably) taken to mean a male whose lifelong sexual pattern involves
relationships with other men," they observe, "the epidemiological term homosexual does
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Ministry reported a dramatic spike in the infection rate among fe-
male sex workers (henceforth FSWs).' 6 Shortly thereafter, the Thai
anti-AIDS effort, which had been the sole province of the Health
Ministry, 7 took on an entirely different character, with the Prime
Minister personally overseeing a newly-formed AIDS committee.
18
This National AIDS Prevention and Control Committee drew per-
sonnel from several Thai government ministries as well as from the
staffs of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in the
region. 9 It was tasked with engineering a multifaceted response to
the emergent crisis.2"
The fact that a sudden explosion in the infection rate among
FSWs elicited such a dramatic official response is hardly surprising,
given the size of the Thai sex industry' and its thorough permeation
of Thai culture.22 Whereas the government considered a high rate of
HIV infection among homosexuals and intravenous drug-users, two
numerically small and socially marginalized sectors of the Thai pop-
ulation,23 a low-grade threat to the public health at large, the state
not readily accommodate people who engage in traditional practices where there is a
transitory, male-to-male sexual element; or situational sex in male-only institutions such
as the military, prisons, or sporting clubs." Id. at 43. By neglecting all of these potential
sites of transmission, the perception of HIV as affecting only "homosexual or bisexual
males, [intravenous drug users], or foreigners" had dangerous implications in the early
days of HIV. Abdel-Monem, supra note 12, at 384.
16. Abdel-Monem, supra note 12, at 384. The increase was as sharp as it was sudden:
in the northern city of Chiang-Mai, near Thailand's border with Myanmar (then Burma),
the HIV infection rate among FSWs jumped from nearly zero to forty-four percent in
1989. Id.; see also LESLIE ANN JEFFREY, SEX AND BORDERS: GENDER, NATIONAL IDENTITY,
AND PROSTITUTION POLICY IN THAILAND xiv (2002) (citing forty-one to fifty-four percent
HIV infection rates among FSWs in northern Thailand in the early 1990s, and a median
rate of twenty-four percent nationwide).
17. Abdel-Monem, supra note 12, at 384.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See JEFFREY, supra note 16, at xii (citing a 1964 Thai police estimate that 426,908
women were then working as prostitutes in Thailand). The size of the Thai sex industry
mushroomed with the advent of the Vietnam War and the arrival of United States military
forces in the country. See infra Part II. More current estimates place the number of
FSWs as high as one million. See Abdel-Monem, supra note 12, at 385 (citing a range of
estimates from four hundred thousand to one million).
22. See Abdel-Monem, supra note 12, at 385-86. 'Thai males patronize [FSWs] at
high rates. An estimated thirty to fifty percent of males have reported commercial sex
experience. In some regions, samples indicate that seventy percent of all males' first sex
partners were reported to be [FSWs]." Id. (citations omitted).
23. 'The prevailing view was still that HIV and AIDS had come from abroad and were
mostly confined to a few individuals in High-Risk groups. It was still not generally recog-
nized that the epidemic would spread more widely." AVERT, supra note 2. Even the Thai
government utilized the confinement of HIV/AIDS to certain individuals and groups to
reassure Thai citizens that the disease would not spread. The government stated that
"[t]he general public need not be alarmed. Thai-to-Thai transmission is not in evidence."
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recognized almost instantly that an epidemic among FSWs posed an
immediate threat to the entire population.24 To understand the cen-
tral role played by the Thai sex industry in both the initial dissemi-
nation and subsequent arrest of the virus,25 it is necessary to examine
the history of the industry itself.
II. BIRTH OF A VECTOR: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE THAI SEX
INDUSTRY SINCE THE 1960S
Although commercialized sex had been a part of the culture for
hundreds of years,2" the Thai sex industry as it exists today was cre-
ated by and for the United States military in the years surrounding
the Vietnam War.2 In the mid to late 1960s, as United States military
involvement in Southeast Asia grew year by year,2" United States
and Thai officials collaborated to forge both treaties and informal
understandings that had the effect of creating an elaborate, country-
wide "personal services" sector, primarily although covertly sexual
in nature, catering to the United States military.29
AVERT, supra note 2. The fact that HIV's confinement to these groups would reassure
Thais that the disease would not spread supports the conclusion that these groups were,
or at least were understood to be, numerically small and discrete. Id.
24. See Abdel-Monem, supra note 12, at 385 (describing the government's appreciation
of the risk to the "general population" of a high rate of HIV infection among FSWs and
the urgency of its subsequent efforts).
25. For a cultural anthropologist's take on the Thai government's fixation on FSWs
as the primary vehicle of the HIV/AIDS threat, see Graham Fordham, Moral Panic and
the Construction of National Order: HIV/AIDS Risk Groups and Moral Boundaries in
the Creation of Modern Thailand, 21 CRITIQUE OF ANTHROPOLOGY 259, 260 (2001):
Thailand in the early 1990s was experiencing both rapid economic growth
and, as analysts such as Ford and Kittisuksathit (1994), Fordham (1998),
Cash (1993, 1995), and Chayan (1993) point out, rapidly changing social and
sexual mores which gave rise to widespread concerns about controlling female
sexuality. Thus, that the HIV moral panic of the early 1990s focused on prosti-
tutes, whose unrestrained sexuality clearly marked them as contravening
the behavioral rules for good women, is not surprising.
26. See JEFFREY, supra note 16, at 3-28 (charting the early development of prosti-
tution in Thailand and Southeast Asia generally and the dramatic course of changing
cultural attitudes toward the phenomenon).
27. See Elizabeth Rho-Ng, Comment, The Conscription of Asian Sex Slaves: Causes
and Effects of U.S. Military Colonialism in Thailand and the Call to Expand U.S. Asylum
Law, 7 ASIAN L.J. 103, 105 (2000).
28. See generally Tim Kaine, Global U.S. Troop Deployment 1950-2003, Heritage
Foundation Center for Data Analysis Report No. CDA04-11, Oct. 27, 2004, available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/upload/71126_L.pdf.
29. See Rho-Ng, supra note 27, at 109-10. Seen in the light of subsequent Thai gov-
ernments' hard-line attitude toward prostitution, the degree of official Thai collusion with
the United States military in this matter is astounding.
In 1966, the Thai government passed the Service Establishment Act, also
referred to as the Entertainment Act, which regulated the operations of ser-
vice businesses such as hotels, night-clubs, bars and massage parlors which
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The United States military presence "throughout Southeast Asia
in the 1950s and 60s planted the roots of militarized prostitution in
Thailand,"3 ° and this process has left an imprint on the institution
lasting to this day.31 'This infusion of U.S. servicemen, and their over-
running of R & R destinations such as Bangkok contributed directly
to the development of a massive prostitution market in Thailand in
the late 1960s."32 Such was the scale and economic importance of this
activity that "[i]n Bangkok and other cities designated as R&R des-
tinations, the sale of sexual services to U.S. servicemen became the
basis for the local economy."33 This economic boom was not only large
in scope but diversified in nature, as many sectors were benefitted
by the influx of men and dollars; 'local establishments profited tre-
mendously"' from United States military patronage of Thai "hotels,
nightclubs, video parlors, and venereal disease counseling busi-
nesses."35 Far from being hidden or unsanctioned by the authori-
ties, the situation on the ground mirrored that at the highest levels
of government and the military.36 As all parties stood to gain,37 the
catered to the U.S. military. Notably, during the economic revitalization phase
of the late 1960s, army officers on both sides of the planning board played
leading roles in formulating Thai tourism policies which legitimized prosti-
tution. Negotiations between a general of the Thai Royal Air Force (whose
wife was a co-director of [the Tourist Organization of Thailand]) and a U.S.
Air Force officer launched what would later become part of the most lucrative
R & R sex business in the world. The Thai government signed a document
known as the "1967 Rest and Recreation Treaty" ("R & R Treaty") with the
U.S. This codification of a U.S.-Thai alliance, [was] intended to ensure the
servicing of the U.S. military during the Vietnam War ... In 1967, an
estimated U.S. $5 million was spent on R & R leave in Thailand by U.S.
military personnel. Shortly after 1968, the U.S. canceled Hong Kong and
Sydney, Australia as alternate R & R destinations, thereby placing greater
emphasis on Thailand's main attraction. In 1970, the amount spent on R &
R leave in Thailand exploded to U.S. $20 million, as much as one-fourth of
the total value of rice exports for that year.
Id. (citations omitted).
30. Id. at 105 (citations omitted).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. Although the "R&R" services provided to United States Servicemen in Thailand
kept local economies afloat, some authors have argued the sexual services provided were
equally as crucial for the United States Servicemen: "[w]ithout a standardized 'rest and
recreation' period, would the U.S. military commanders be able to send young men off
on long, often tedious, sea voyages and ground maneuvers?" Id.
34. Id. at 106.
35. Rho-Ng, supra note 27, at 106.
36. Id. at 109-10.
37. All the male parties, that is. It is necessary to remember that however tremendous
the profits may have been, and however beneficial the industry may have been to the
Thai economy, this form of commerce had very real human costs, born by the Thai FSWs.
"With its rampant consumerism, the U.S. military assisted [t]he owners of brothels and
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enterprise was fostered by both sides. "A cooperative yet often corrupt
relationship among the U.S. military, the local Thai government and
local bar owners long sustained Bangkok's sexual services industry."38
That prostitution was illegal in Thailand at this time, having
been banned by the Suppression of Prostitution Act of 1960,"9 demon-
strates the perceived centrality of the sex industry to the Thai econ-
omy.4 ° This deliberate sexualization of the Thai tourism industry
became a self-fulfilling prophecy, and civilian sex tourists began to
visit the country in rapidly growing numbers.4' As the American mili-
tary presence in Southeast Asia diminished in the 1970s,42 Thailand
plowed even more resources into its foreign tourism industry to
make up for the shortfall.43 "Prostitution services - sold, for instance,
through joint venture links between hotels, travel agencies, and air-
lines to sex-tour groups - became a lucrative way to fill the empty
hotel rooms left by American servicemen .... Thus the structural
basis of prostitution became well entrenched during the 1970s."44
The departure of the United States military did not sound the
death knell for the Thai sex trade.45 If anything, it has flourished,
becoming the centerpiece of Thailand's already formidable tourism
industry.46 A quick glance at the demographic data on the industry
reveals the lingering influence of the four-decades-old agreement be-
tween the United States military and the Thai government to make
Thailand a prime destination for commercial sex:
bars - almost all male - in profiting from the sexual services industry by systematically
controlling and exploiting Thai women." Id. at 106 (citations omitted).
38. Id.
39. See Human Rights Watch, Thai Legal Context, available at http://hrw.org/
about/projects/womrep/General- 125.htm (last viewed Oct. 18, 2006) (discussing the Thai
Suppression of Prostitution Act of 1960). The Entertainment Places Act of 1966 has been
characterized as supplanting the Prostitution Prohibition Act. Id. Many of the "places
of service" covered by the Entertainment Places Act failed to register, and of the places
that did register, enforcement of the anti-prostitution laws was lax. Id.
40. See Rho-Ng, supra note 27, at 109-10 (describing official toleration of military-
oriented prostitution, typically conducted under the "special services" designation, and
thereby technically avoiding classification as commercial sex).
41. Id. at 112-13. The United States Servicemen left a bustling "R&R" industry that
was easily adaptable to create "sex package tours" for foreign businessmen. Id. at 111.
Although the precise number of men who travel specifically for sexual services is un-
known, in 1986 seventy-three percent of the total number of tourists were male, and in
1988 the number of tourists rose from 1.8 million to 4.3 million. Id. at 111-13.
42. See Kane, supra note 28. From a high of over five hundred thousand troops in
1968, "the total number of U.S. troops in Vietnam declined dramatically in every year
thereafter, until the complete pullout in 1975." Id.
43. Rho-Ng, supra note 27, at 111.
44. JEFFREY, supra note 16, at 40.
45. Rho-Ng, supra note 27, at 111.
46. Id.
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In 1988, the number of tourists rose to 4.3 million. Of this figure,
three-fourths were unaccompanied males. By 1995, it was esti-
mated that there were more than five million tourists visiting
Thailand every year, many of whom were sex tourists. The
visitors - mostly men from the U.S., Europe, Australia and the
Middle East - find their respite in areas like Patpong and Soi
Cowboy where they are sexually and emotionally serviced, much
like their predecessors, U.S. servicemen during the Vietnam War.47
The end result of this historical process (a large population of FSWs,
a massive volume of foreign sex tourism, and a national economy
heavily reliant on the sex trade),48 taken in combination with a high
rate of domestic patronage of FSWs, created fertile ground for an
HIV/AIDS catastrophe.49 By the mid-1980s, Thailand was in a po-
sition not only to see its own population ravaged by the disease, but
to export it through human trafficking," a tragic side effect of its bur-
geoning sex sector.51
However one chooses to define human trafficking,52 the practice
centers on a coercive relationship whereby a person is transported
for the economic benefit of another.53 FSWs in Thailand have often
been trafficked there from other countries in Southeast Asia,54 due to
47. Id. at 112-13 (citations omitted).
48. Id. at 113-14.
49. Abdel-Monem, supra note 12, at 385-86.
50. Id.; Rho-Ng, supra note 27, at 115.
51. See Abigail Schwartz, Sex Trafficking in Cambodia, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 371,
388-89 (2004) (designating Thailand as simultaneously a source, transit, and destination
country in the Southeast Asian human trafficking network).
52. See id. at 375.
[D]efinitions still vary greatly. Of course, there is some shared ground.
Generally, every definition contains three common elements: 1) the recruit-
ment and/or transportation of a human, 2) for work or service, and 3) for the
profit of the trafficker. However, confusion arises because the phenomenon
of trafficking encircles other social evils such as forced labor, illegal migration,
and prostitution. Some law and policy makers would distinguish trafficking
from these other issues as much as possible; others see such a practice as
a largely fruitless formalistic exercise.
Id. (citations omitted).
53. Id. But see Plummer & Porter, supra note 15, at 46. The authors insist that a phe-
nomenon as complex as human trafficking must be problematized to reveal the agency of
the women involved. In discussions of human trafficking, "[w]omen are typically portrayed
as 'victims' of social and economic forces in which they have little prospect of exercising
choice. Attitudes and behaviors are one-dimensional and unproblematic." Id. Trafficked
women can enter such arrangements voluntarily, for economic reasons, and should not be
considered the victims of their traffickers, but rather their business partners. Id.
54. See Schwartz, supra note 51, at 389. The growth in human trafficking is partially
the byproduct of economic development in the region: "Globalization and advances in
LEARNING FROM THE THAI FIGHT AGAINST HIV
Thailand's longstanding reputation in the region as a place where
there is serious money to be made selling sex.55 Thailand is also a
source country, meaning that Thai women are regularly trafficked
out of the country to work as FSWs.56 The scale upon which this prac-
tice is carried out is tremendous, and it involves individuals from all
strata of Thai society, as
the huge amount of easy money draws in international crime
syndicates as well as corrupt government officials who hope to
augment their often paltry salaries. National and international
press and human rights reports all emphasize that the sex sector
is supported by politicians, police, armed forces, and civil servants,
who receive bribes, demand sexual favors, and are themselves
customers and often partial owners of the establishments. For
example, Burmese children often speak of how policemen or
border guards were involved in their trafficking into Thailand
and how they had to entertain policemen.5"
Thailand, because of its sex industry and human trafficking, has
from an epidemiological standpoint come to both threaten and be
threatened by its neighbors in the region.58
III. FIGHTING TIME, IGNORANCE, AND APATHY ALL AT ONCE: THE
THAI GOVERNMENT TAKES ON HIV/AIDS
The uniquely widespread and entrenched character of the Thai
sex industry and the increasing porosity of national boundaries meant
that when the HIV menace became evident the Thai government was
not the only interested party.59 In the late 1980s the Ministry of Public
Health received support and financial backing from the UN World
technology have increased public awareness of the problem to a larger degree but have
also facilitated the trafficking process.... Infrastructure development, such as better
roads and communication systems, has reduced costs and expanded the reach of traf-
fickers." Id.
55. Rho-Ng, supra note 27, at 112.
56. Schwartz, supra note 51, at 389.
57. Id. at 389-90 (citations omitted); see also Anchalee Singhanetra-Renard, Population
Movement and the AIDS Epidemic in Thailand, in SEXUAL CULTURES AND MIGRATION
IN THE ERA OF AIDS: ANTHROPOLOGICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES 70,79 (Gilbert
Herdt ed., 1997) (examining the rural-urban migration in Thailand and noting that the
widespread practice, traditionally one of rural Thais' few opportunities for upward social
and economic mobility, is now, given its linkage with the sex industry, a major conduit
for the dissemination of HIV in Thailand).
58. Schwartz, supra note 51, at 389-90.
59. See Abdel-Monem, supra note 12, at 383-84.
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Health Organization (WHO),6 ° and the two bodies launched a joint
HIV education and prevention scheme.6 Limited in resources and
scope,62 this assortment of programs was no match for the problem
once the virus spread to the FSW population. 3 In 1991, the Prime
Minister assumed the chairmanship of the newly created National
AIDS Prevention and Control Committee,64 which quickly generated
an intensified, multifaceted response.6" Recognizing the need to reach
as many Thais as possible with its prevention message, the Commit-
tee's strategy included a major advertising blitz focused on encour-
aging condom use in all commercial sex encounters. 66 The uncompro-
mising nature of the government's effort to tackle the HIV problem by
focusing on making commercial sex safer is especially admirable in
light of its then thirty-year-old prohibition of prostitution.67 That the
1960 law was widely flouted was, of course, a well known fact in
Thailand,6" but the government's willingness to set this aspect of
its social policy aside and deal with the implications of HIV for
60. Id.
61. Id. These efforts "focused on strengthening programs within the formal healthcare
and education systems, such as increased training among healthcare professionals,
condom distribution, and stronger surveillance programs." Id. at 384. Although commend-
able, the Ministry of Health/WHO program was not particularly well funded and had a
narrow focus, due to the perceived source of the HIV/AIDS risk at the time: high risk
groups and foreigners. AVERT, supra note 2 (citations omitted).
62. The HV prevention budget for 1988 was the equivalent of one hundred eighty
thousand dollars. AVERT, supra note 2.
63. See Abdel-Monem, supra note 12, at 384.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Robert Hanenberg, Impact of Thailand's HIV-Control Programme as indicated
by the Decline of Sexually Transmitted Diseases, 344 LANCET 243,243 (1994) (summarizing
the Thai government response as "the following parts: the government bought and dis-
tributed sufficient condoms to protect much of the commercial sex in the country; sanctions
were brought against commercial sex establishments where condoms were not used con-
sistently; and a media campaign bluntly advised men to use condoms with prostitutes").
Id.; see also Beyrer, supra note 9 (calling the response an "exception" to the regional
problem of "Asian governments [being] slow to respond to the threats of AIDS." Further-
more, Beyrer notes "[a] vigorous '100 percent' condom campaign, aggressive treatment
of STDs, reform of blood-banking practices, widespread public education campaigns,
significant domestic funding for prevention and care, and considerable political pressure
are the elements of Thailand's successful campaign." Id. at 221.
67. See Rho-Ng, supra note 27, at 117-18. As a result of pressure applied by the
United Nations's passage in 1950 of the International Convention for the Suppression
of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, Thailand
scrapped its 1908 Venereal Disease Control Act, under which prostitution had enjoyed
full legal status. Id. at 118. Nevertheless, "any deference paid to these international human
rights mandates has been superficial at best." Id. at 118.
68. Id.
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commercial sex as a simple fact69 shows the pragmatic attitude it
took toward its HIV/AIDS work.
This pragmatism bore fruit, as the epidemiological data sug-
gest.7° By almost all accounts, 71 the Thai government's strenuous
push to arrest the rate at which HIV spread through its population
was a straightforward success. 72 Chris Beyrer observes73 that, in the
wake of the government's anti-HIV campaign,
[r]ates among military conscripts have decreased from the high
of 12.5 percent of all recruits in northern Thailand in 1991 to less
than 4 percent in 1999. General population prevalence is es-
timated to have decreased from 2.7 percent of all adults to 2.3
percent over the last five years - the first example of population-
level declines in a severe epidemic in Asia.74
69. In the Asian context, HIV/AIDS policies deemed "progressive" are often so only
in relative terms. The fact that Thailand has even officially recognized its HIV problem
puts it far ahead of some other countries in the region. Neighboring Myanmar (formerly
Burma), for example, has shown a lasting refusal to acknowledge its HIV epidemic. See
Anna Johansson, Comment, A Silent Emergency Persists: The Limited Efficacy of U.S.
Investment Sanctions on Burma, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 317, 327 (2000).
While the World Health Organization estimates approximately 500,000 of
Burma's forty-seven million people are HIV positive, the regime acknowl-
edges only 21,503 confirmed HIV cases and 2,854 AIDS cases. In April 1999,
Dr. Peter Piot, executive director of the United Nations AIDS program
UNAIDS said, "Burma has the second worst AIDS epidemic in Asia.... But
the big problem is the recognition of the problem by the government."
Id. (citations omitted); see also Jeremy Sarkin & Marek Pietschmann, Legitimate
Humanitarian Intervention under International Law in the Context of the Current
Human Rights and Humanitarian Crisis in Burma (Myanmar), 33 H.K.L.J. 371, 384
(2003) (citing a World Bank estimate for Myanmar of "over 1 million cases of HIV/AIDS
in 2000. Other sources speak of 4 per cent to 5 per cent of the population being HIV-
positive, more even than in Thailand") (citations omitted).
70. Beyrer, supra note 9, at 220-21.
71. Note that "[d]espite an increase in contraceptive use and decrease in the inci-
dence of sexually transmitted diseases credited to public health education campaigns,
the HIV/AIDS epidemic continued to spread among the population." Abdel-Monem, supra
note 12, at 386. The government's program did not entirely stop the spread of the virus,
but most observers agree that it decreased the transmission rate. See Hanenberg, supra
note 66.
72. The Thai initiative has "saved millions of lives, reducing the number of new HIV
infections from 143,000 in 1991 to 19,000 in 2003." AVERT, supra note 2 (citations omitted).
73. Beyrer, supra note 9, at 220-21.
74. Id. (citations omitted); see also Hanenberg, supra note 66, at 243, citing even
more dramatic results:
Between 1989 and 1993 the use of condoms in commercial sex in Thailand
increased from 14 to 94%, according to surveys of prostitutes, and the number
of cases of the five major sexually transmitted diseases declined by 79% in
men. We estimate that sex acts with prostitutes where there was a risk of
HIV transmission declined from about 26% in June, 1989, to about 16% in
June, 1993.
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By treating HIV/AIDS as the mortal threat it was and is and by heed-
ing the sometimes difficult-to-follow advice of both outside experts
and its own domestic public health officials,75 the Thai government
managed not only to slow the spread of a deadly disease among its
population but to set an example for future efforts.76
Thailand is a developing nation and cannot bring financial re-
sources to bear on a health problem in the way the United States or
another first world industrialized nation could." Given this back-
ground, Thailand's ability to make such significant progress against
HIV/AIDS potentially meant all the more for other developing coun-
tries' prospects, should they face an epidemic of such proportions. 8
This success, however, was not cheaply bought, and it accounted for
a relatively large portion of Thai domestic expenditures.7 The eco-
nomic setback suffered by Thailand (and Southeast Asia generally)
in 1997' had serious negative consequences for the HIV/AIDS effort
in that country.8'
IV. THE WHEELS FALL OFF: THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 1997 AND ITS
IMPACT ON THAI HIV/AIDS POLICY
For a variety of reasons,82 the Thai economy, which had been
growing at a rapid pace, hit a brick wall in 1997.83 The crash, which
was severe enough to necessitate an International Monetary Fund
emergency loan,' "[h]ad major social implications for unemploy-
ment, under employment, household income contraction, changing
75. See AVERT, supra note 2.
76. The extent to which the Thai model can be transplanted to other countries facing
HIV epidemics is an open question. Thailand had many factors working in its favor in
1991: a government willing to accept the existence and severity of the problem, a sub-
stantial NGO presence with major resources to contribute, and, critically, a communi-
cations network capable of reaching the vast bulk of the population. See Abdel-Monem,
supra note 12, at 384. The importance of this last factor in the Thai effort makes the pros-
pects for success of such a project in other developing countries seem questionable. Id.
77. A Partnership for Poverty Reduction, WORLD BANK, June 4, 2002, http://go.world
bank.org/KRWLPRF670. In 2000 the Thai poverty rate stood at 14.5%. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Viroj Tangcharoensathien et al., Health Impacts of Rapid Economic Change
in Thailand, 51 SOC. SCI. & MED. 789, 799 (2000) (citing Thai Budget Bureau statistics
that show the Public Health Ministry's share of the national budget as 7.49%, as of 1998).
80. See id. at 789.
81. Id. at 797.
82. Id. at 790. The authors attribute the collapse to, among other things, "high-risk
and low-return economic activities in the non-tradable sector," which led to a high deficit.
Id. 'The decline in regional demand for Thai exports exacerbated the problem, leading
to a sharp fall in exports and a slowdown in economic growth in 1996." Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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expenditure patterns, and child abandonment. The crisis increased
poverty incidence by 1 million, of whom 54% were the ultra-poor." 5
Naturally, this economic setback had an impact on the government's
ability to maintain its cost-intensive HIV/AIDS program.
The 1998 national AIDS programme budget was cut by 25% in
nominal and 33% in real terms .... The first three programme ac-
tivities consuming the highest proportions of the [reduced] budget
involved medical interventions; the use of antiretroviral drugs
(ARV), opportunistic infection drugs and donor blood screening.
Despite the high budget allocation, these medical interventions
could not effectively match the potential demand for curative ser-
vices. In addition, cost inflation of opportunistic infection drugs
and other imported medical goods further aggravated the prob-
lems of limited resources in 1998."6
The prognosis from many expert observers was grim: with its funding
slashed, how could the HIV/AIDS program hope to continue stem-
ming the tide? 7 Writing in March of 1998 about previous projections
of HIV incidence in Thailand into the twenty-first century, one com-
mentator warned of a fundamental problem that could potentially
undo the program's success: if the Health Ministry stopped distrib-
uting condoms, would 100% use become a memory?8 The supply of
condoms from the Health Ministry did not, in fact, dry up entirely,
but it was sharply reduced from 1995 through 1997. 89
85. Tangcharoensathien et al., supra note 79, at 789. The authors define the ultra-
poor as Thais with household income levels below eighty percent of the official poverty
line. Id. at 791. Thailand's National Statistical Office set the official poverty line for 1990
at 522 Baht per capita per month. Id. at 791 n. 2. As of February 28, 2007, 522 Baht
would equal $14.73. Bank of Thailand, Foreign Exchange Rates, http://www.bot.or.th
(citing the Feb. 28, 2007 daily exchange rate of the Thai Baht to the United States
Dollar) (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
86. Tangcharoensathien et al., supra note 79, at 797.
87. Id. at 806.
88. See Kenrad E. Nelson, Editorial Comment, The Demographic Impact of the HIV
Epidemic in Thailand, 12 AIDS 813, 814 (1998):
Studies of military conscripts have shown that high levels of compliance with
the 100% condom program have been achieved in Northern Thailand, par-
tially because of the Ministry of Public Health program of distributing free
condoms to women in commercial sex establishments and monitoring their
use. If the provision of free condoms, monitoring and education programs were
to falter because of economic constraints, it seems likely that the risks of HIV
transmission from commercial sex would increase. Few men who visit brothels
report bringing their own condoms; most rely on the availability of free con-
doms at the establishment and the social pressure supporting their use.
Id. (citations omitted).
89. See Tangcharoensathien et al., supra note 79, at 800-01 (noting that the "budget
for free condom distribution in brothels was significantly cut by 16% and 72% in 1995-96
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To date, a full picture of the economic crash's ramifications for
the HIV/AIDS program has yet to emerge;90 there is contradictory
evidence with regard to overall HIV prevalence91 and discouraging
anecdotal evidence regarding rates of condom use in commercial sex,
which is itself changing shape as a result of the economic slump.92 An
increasing number of FSWs are working independently, outside the
structure of the brothel system and thus outside direct government
oversight.9 3 Many of these independent operators are not Thai and
have moved onto the less prestigious rungs of the sex industry ladder
to fill the void left by the Thai women no longer willing to work in
such conditions.94 This informalization of commercial sex is an unfor-
tunate development from an epidemiological9" as well as a human
and 1996-97. The total condom distribution fell from 50-60 million items in 1995 and 1996,
to 11.2 and 14.2 million pieces in 1997 and 1998").
90. Id. at 806.
91. Although targeted "risk" groups saw their HIV rates decline throughout the 1990s,
the virus spread widely throughout the general population. Abdel-Monem, supra note
12, at 387. One should guard against complacency in the Thai case, as slowing infection
rates do not cure the infected; "[slince the outbreak of the epidemic in the late 1980s, an
estimated 300-350,000 people have died of AIDS in Thailand, with 66,000 dying in 1999
alone." Id. at 388 (citations omitted). But cf. Tangcharoensathien et al., supra note 79,
at 799-800 ("The STD incidence per 1000 population followed the pre-crisis downward
trend, from 0.494 in 1996 to 0.379 and 0.305 in 1997 and 1998 respectively. It is a sus-
tained result of the pre-crisis campaign for 100% condom coverage preventing HIV/AIDS
among commercial sex workers.").
92. See Beyrer, supra note 9, at 221 (arguing a serious lack of interest in prevention
efforts among drug users and describing "the changing nature of the sex industry, which
now involves many more women and girls trafficked from Burma and tribal areas" of
Thailand itself. Because they lead such secluded lives, "[t]hese vulnerable women have
proven more difficult to reach and to support than the Thai women who preceded them
in the trade. In addition, the large, gay-male commercial sex industry has continued to
see high rates of infection").
93. Id.
94. Sukhontha Kongsin, Economic Impact of HIV/AIDS Mortality on Households in
Rural Thailand, in No PLACE FOR BORDERS: THE HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC AND DEVELOPMENT
IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, supra note 15, at 89. With improving economic conditions in
Thailand came an increasing unwillingness on the part of Thai women to work in what
were perceived as less desirable sex industry roles. Id. "Thai women are becoming less
willing to prostitute themselves at home or in low-paid positions; they will work in
Bangkok bath houses or brothels but not so much now at truck stops or in cheap rural
establishments," where FSWs are less empowered to assert themselves regarding the
use of condoms. Id. "Increasingly, it is Burmese, Hill-tribe and Chinese women who work
in these wretched village brothels and then return to their home countries without, in
many cases, realising that they have contracted HIV." Id.
95. The World Bank's Global HIV/AIDS Program of Action, WORLD BANK, Dec. 2005,
at 2, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTHIVAIDS/Resources/375798-1127498796401/
GHAPAFinal.pdf. "It is more difficult to target individuals with risky behaviours when
they are subject to social taboos, or are marginalised, or not clearly identified - for ex-
ample, widely dispersed informal and part time sex workers who do not work in establish-
ments or 'red-light' districts." Id. at 14.
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perspective (many of these non-brothel FSWs are trafficked women),96
as "[w]hen commercial sex workers diversif[y] services from a brothel
base to a more informal and casual arrangement not using a condom
with casual partners has a high risk for HIV infections .... Sero-
surveillance cannot detect these informal sex services and the true
picture is therefore masked. 97
It is possible to overstate the HIV/AIDS-related damage done by
the economic crash and the subsequent budget cuts, at least as far
as condom distribution and its direct effects are concerned.9" Also,
the anecdotal observation that much of the commercial sex trade has
moved out of the brothels and into the informal sector may mean that
a top-down governmental effort such as the 100% target cannot be
regarded as a permanent solution to a problem with such protean
characteristics. 99
96. Beyrer, supra note 9, at 222.
97. Tangcharoensathien et al., supra note 79, at 800, 805. The authors' concern is
that the government's message has been understood almost exclusively in the context
of brothel-based commercial sex, with the result that men associate the safe-sex message
with brothel visits and nothing else. Id. '"There is a need for effective health messages
on 'using condoms with any non-regular partners' by the national HIV/AIDS control pro-
gramme." Id. at 800.
98. See id. for a measured analysis of the condom drought's impact on HIV trans-
mission (pressure applied to clients by FSWs appears to have been at least as important
as the provision of the condoms themselves) and the growing importance of non-commercial
sex as a vector for HIV. Id.
Analysis indicates that resource reduction in the AIDS programme and free
condom distribution did not jeopardize the programme outcome, if [FSW]s
urged their clients to use condoms and if the message on condom use among
clients was sustained. Moreover, there is no channel to distribute free con-
doms among casual sex partners outside brothels or other indirect establish-
ments - which is increasingly important - so messages about personal
responsibility on safe sex may be more important than free condom distri-
bution in brothels.
Id. at 801. But see Nelson, supra note 88, at 814, for a prescient take on the (then) pro-
spective effects of the economic crisis on the HIV program's success:
Studies of military conscripts have shown that high levels of compliance with
the 100% condom program have been achieved in Northern Thailand, par-
tially because of the Ministry of Public Health program of distributing free
condoms to women in commercial sex establishments and monitoring their
use. If the provision of free condoms, monitoring and education programs
were to falter because of economic constraints, it seems likely that the risks
of HIV transmission from commercial sex would increase.
Id. Nelson takes a position unlike Tangcharoensathien's on the issue of male FSW
clients' motivations in using condoms: he thinks that the success of the 100% condom
program was inextricably tied to the combination of government-provided condoms and
pressure by FSWs to use them. If free condoms are not made readily available, they are
much less likely to be used in commercial sex, as "[flew men who visit brothels report
bringing their own condoms; most rely on the availability of free condoms at the estab-
lishment." Id.
99. See Beyrer, supra note 9, at 221.
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V. TAKING STOCK: THE NEW DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE HIV/AIDS
THREAT AND SOME POSSIBLE WAYS FORWARD
One lesson from the post-crash analysis of the state of the Thai
HIV/AIDS prevention program is that the target has likely shifted
in the years since the program's inception. 100 In 1998,
the major transmission risk has become sexual transmission
among married couples and mother-to-infant transmission. Pre-
vention of HIV transmission among married couples is a very
difficult public health challenge. Regular condom use among
married couples is unusual unless both partners are aware that
one is infected with HIV. Diagnosis of HIV infection in married
men or women prior to transmission to their regular partner is
the public health challenge of the future for the control of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic in Thailand.' 0'
Essentially, the passage of fifteen years and the expenditure of moun-
tains of government and outside funds have seen off the HIV threat
in its initial form and has succeeded in preventing many thousands
of people from being infected.' 2 Naturally, though, it did not get into
gear before any transmissions took place, and the majority of these
were likely FSW-to-client (and vice versa). These clients, often mar-
ried men not accustomed to using condoms with their wives' (and
indeed, never instructed to do so by the government public-aware-
ness campaign), 14 are the new face of the HIV threat.0 5 The women
they came home to and infected years ago are now beginning to show
symptoms of HIV,106 and the consequences for the Thai HIV strategy
promise to be dire.'
100. The World Bank's Global HIV/AIDS Program of Action, supra note 95 (noting
that changing social factors, among other causes, have made women more susceptible
to infection, "resulting in an increasing feminization of the epidemic, particularly in Sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia").
101. Nelson, supra note 88, at 814.
102. AVERT, supra note 2.
103. The fact that the 100% condom program has made little progress in stopping trans-
mission within marriages is evidence that condom use in these situations is rare. Rev.
Leonardo Legaspi, O.P., D.D., Archbishop of Caceres, Naga City, Evangelium Vitae and
the Churches in Asia (Dec. 5,2005), available at http://webservice.mnl.ust.edu.ph/bioethics/
absComment.asp?RecNo=5.
104. The 100% condom program could be more accurately described as "100% condom
use for all commercial sex." Id.
105. "Now half of the newly identified infections [in Thailand] are occurring among the
wives and sexual partners of men who got infected several years ago." Id.
106. See Abdel-Monem, supra note 12, at 387 (citing a ten-year average incubation
period for the AIDS virus).
107. Id. Unless a cure or more effective treatments are discovered in the very near
future, Abdel-Monem postulates a grim future for AIDS sufferers in Thailand and for Thai
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In determining how to cope with this mutated threat, worth
noting is that the sexual practices of married couples may be more
difficult to change (from unprotected to protected sex) than those of
FSWs and their clients.°8 One unintended consequence of the 100%
condom program's success may be that Thai men associate condom
use with commercial sex, to the exclusion of everything else."° Rather
than attempt to change the way men conceive of marital sex, it will
probably make more sense to focus on widespread testing, followed
by antiretroviral treatment as the primary mode of preventing fur-
ther transmission. 110
Not only is Thailand dealing with a new primary mode of HIV
transmission, but it is now facing a drain on its financial and public-
health-dedicated resources that was not yet present in the program's
1990s heyday:"' providing treatment to the huge number of Thais
living with the disease and its devastating effects." 2 As of 2001, the
Thai health service was providing antiretroviral drugs for a tiny
fraction of the number in need of them,"3 and even this token effort
placed the government's financial resources under heavy pressure." 4
As costly and logistically difficult as the government found its 100%
condom campaign to be," 5 it is beginning to look very cheap indeed
next to the costs involved in keeping a large number of HIV-positive
citizens alive and healthy.'16 The fact that Thailand, which is econom-
ically well-off in comparison with other countries in Southeast Asia,
society at large. Id.
mhe magnitude of the epidemic may have dramatic effects on the country
as a whole. These include a sharp increase in the number of AIDS orphans
in Thailand, an expansion of healthcare costs for treating persons with AIDS
amounting to as much as one-half of the annual income of some households,
and sharp increases in infant mortality and decreases in life expectancy.
Id.
108. Nelson, supra note 88, at 814.
109. See id. (discussing the failure of married couples to use condoms).
110. Such testing should be provided on a cost-free, anonymous basis, in recognition
of the need to include the economically disadvantaged, as well as the likelihood that not
all social stigma has been removed from HIV infection, despite the government's infor-
mation campaign and a higher level of openness and frank discussion.
111. See Beyrer, supra note 9, at 221.
112. Id.
113. As of 2001, the government furnished antiretrovirals to roughly twenty-three
hundred people, a mere four percent of the people who needed them. Id.
114. "Even this small number of patients receiving care, however, consumes roughly
20 percent of the entire AIDS budget." Id.
115. See generally Tangcharoensathien et al., supra note 79, at 801 (discussing the price
inflation for condoms and practical distribution issues).
116. Indeed, the government's prevention efforts, which still include a putative 100%
condom program, consume only eight percent of what Thailand spends on its fight against
HIV/AIDS. Beyrer, supra note 9, at 221.
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is able to medicate so few of its ailing citizens117 bodes ill for neigh-
boring countries' ability to do so, should they attempt to launch HIV
initiatives of their own." '
Skyrocketing pharmaceutical costs are facts of life in the de-
veloping world just as they are in the rich world," 9 but people living
in the developing world have far scanter resources with which to meet
them.'2° For countries like Thailand that have a significant popula-
tion already suffering from AIDS-related illnesses, simple prevention
can no longer be the primary goal. In addition to holding back the
rate of new infections, the challenge now involves keeping those al-
ready infected alive long enough to avoid a demographic disaster,'2 '
an impossible task without the help of antiretroviral drugs.'22
Putting Thailand's 100% condom campaign into practice was a
massive undertaking, 23 and one for which the government had a
great deal of outside counsel and logistical support.' 24 Although the
117. "[Allmost 10% of people with HIV/AIDS in Thailand will receive treatment within
two years [from May 2003] by the end of 2005." Nathan Ford, David Wilson, Onanong
Bunjumnong & Tido von Schoen Angerer, The Role of Civil Society in Protecting Public
Health Over Commercial Interests: Lessons from Thailand, MEDICINS SANs FRONTIERES,
Feb. 13, 2004, available at http://www.msf.org.
118. "Although wealthier states with fewer patients can probably afford antivirals
(Japan, South Korea, Singapore, perhaps even Malaysia), most heavily affected states in
Asia are poorer than Thailand (Cambodia, Burma, much of India) and will be hard pressed
to provide any of these drugs." Beyrer, supra note 9, at 221. That Thailand, despite having
suffered such a massive financial crisis in the past decade, looks so robust economically
in comparison with its neighbors is indicative of the substantial structural obstacles facing
those nations in any attempts to tackle HIV. Id.
119. See generally Pharmaceutical Industry Ranks as Most Profitable Industry -Again,
PUBLIC CITIZEN, Apr. 18, 2002, http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=1088.
120. More than one in five South Africans are living with HIV/AIDS, and one in two
live below the poverty line. CIA World Factbook, South Africa, http://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbooklgeos/sf.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
121. See Abdel-Monem, supra note 12, at 387-88 (noting "[d]eath rates due to AIDS
may be so high that the overall population rate may actually decline by 0.7% annually
instead of increase"). Although 0.7% does not sound catastrophic, it is a huge setback in
demographic terms, with profound consequences for Thai "economic productivity, loss
of income from declining tourism (one of Thailand's strongest domestic industries), prob-
lems related to social stigmatization and discrimination, rising crime rates, and so on."
Id. at 388.
122. In referring to the case of a female patient recently started on ARVs in Haiti, Dr.
Paul Farmer describes himself as "militant about these drugs because we keep seeing
these startling responses to therapy. For people like them it's either anti retrovirals, or,
you know, as she'd probably tell you, or a coffin." THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS,
TUBERCULOSIS, AND MALARIA, Haiti Video Transcript, http://www.theglobalfund.org/enl
in action/stories/haitivideotranscript/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
123. The AIDS program's budget "increased almost 20-fold to $44 million in 1993."
AVERT, supra note 2.
124. See Phil Marshall & Janet Hunt, Non-Government Organisations: Imperatives
and Pitfalls, in No PLACE FOR BORDERS: THE HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC AND DEVELOPMENT IN
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, supra note 15, at 124-27, for an examination of the general modes
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scale of the initiative 2 ' made for daunting costs, which would have
been well beyond the Thai government's ability to underwrite on its
own, condoms were and are very inexpensive when compared with
antiretroviral drugs.126 Current AIDS treatment calls for a number
of different drugs to be used in tandem; 127 a patient is to take several
pills with complementary effects at fixed times during the day. 2 ' The
necessity of adhering to a strict dosage regimen 129 has bred consider-
able skepticism about ARV therapy's potential in settings where pa-
tients cannot be monitored during the course of treatment. 3 ° Pio-
neering researchers like Dr. Paul Farmer,'3 ' however, along with a
growing consensus among the international public health commu-
nity that ARV therapy can be as effective in the developing world as
it has been in the rich world,'32 are working to change these notions.'33
of NGO-government interaction. Abdel-Monem, supra note 12, at 384, gives a great deal
of credit to the NGOs for their early and active participation in the effort.
125. See AVERT, supra note 2.
126. The World Bank estimates the average cost of a year of triple-combination
antiretroviral therapy to be from $8,776 to $13,902. Total Cost Implications of Providing
Anti-Retroviral Therapy, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/aids-econ/arv/floyd/
whoarv-webp4.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007). This does not allow for therapy with
ritonavir, a newer and more expensive ARV drug. Id.; Keith Alcorn, 400 Percent Ritonavir
Price Hike, INTLASS'N OF PHYSICIANS IN AIDS CARE, available at http://www.thebodypro
.com/iapac/jan04/rtv-price.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2007). See Kongsin, supra note 94,
at 90-94, for a discussion of the crushing financial burden placed on rural households by
caring for a family member who has AIDS. In many cases, direct health care costs (hospital
visits, etc.) can account for nearly half of a rural family's average income. Id. at 92-93.
More sobering still is that this figure does not account for the lost earnings of the patient
or those who have to take time off to provide care. Id. at 93-94.
127. AVERT, Introduction to HIV/AIDS Treatment, http://www.avert.org/introtrt.htm
(last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
128. AVERT, Starting Antiretroviral Treatment, http://www.avert.org/starttrt.htm (last
visited Feb. 28, 2007).
129. The World Bank's Global HIV/AIDS Program of Action, supra note 95, at 21.
130. Dr. Farmer has stated:
One of the biggest set of myths we're dealing with are about therapy for
HIV. HIV, it can't be done in a placed [sic] like this. You know, people don't
have other rights, they don't have a concept of time, they don't have wrist-
watches, the medications have to be refrigerated. It's not cost effective. You
know, it's not anything you would ever initiate in a really poor country.
Id. (quoting Dr. Farmer on his skepticism regarding the viability of ARV treatment in
Haiti); see also GLOBAL FUND, supra note 122.
131. See, e.g., PAUL FARMER, INFECTIONS AND INEQUALITIES: THE MODERN PLAGUES at
265-271 (1999), available at http://www.netlibrary.com/urlapi.asp?action=summary&v=
1&bookid=42313 (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
132. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, IMAI (ARV) Toolkit Version 2.0: A Public
Health Approach for Scaling Up Antiretroviral (ARV) Treatment, http://www.who.int/
hiv/toolkit/arv/enlindex.jsp.
Lack of access to antiretroviral (ARV) treatment has perpetuated H1V/AIDS-
related stigma and discrimination in many countries. The cost of medicines,
poor infrastructure and the lack of skilled healthcare workers are frequently
cited as obstacles to scaling up ARV treatment in resource-limited settings.
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Not only is ARV therapy the best option to date for maintaining
the health and continued functionality of those already infected, but
it is also crucial in arresting the spread of the virus to others.14 An
outbreak of HIV/AIDS among a population of FSWs in Haiti raised
a unique set of difficulties. 3 5 The nature of their work puts these
women at much greater risk of infection than the general population,
and its illegal nature makes them more likely to live off the radar of
national health services (assuming such exist); FSWs are potential
vectors almost without parallel elsewhere in society. 3 ' In Haiti,
"[s]topping exploitative prostitution would require addressing pov-
erty, gender inequality, and racism, but in the absence of serious soci-
etal programs with such aims, public health authorities can make
a priority of protecting, rather than punishing, sex workers."'37 This
statement seems to reflect the attitude the Thai government has been
so willing to take with regard to HIV and its sex industry: rather than
tilt at windmills trying to eradicate prostitution itself, focus on mak-
ing prostitution less dangerous for everyone involved and less likely
to spread HIV into the general population.
38
The HIV issue in Haiti is as fraught with problematic social and
cultural implications as it is in Thailand.139 Without the time and re-
sources, to say nothing of a workable theory or method, to solve the
social problems implicated in the Thai sex industry, 4a an AIDS-
treatment-based approach, using ARV therapy, is the only practical
In the face of these challenges, pilot ARV treatment programmes in resource-
limited settings have shown that people with HIV can be successfully treated,
achieving clinical outcomes that are similar to those seen in highly resourced
settings. These pilot projects have also shown that the availability and acces-
sibility of ARV treatment is accompanied by significant reduction in stigma
and discrimination.
Id. The WHO's belief in the possibilities for ARV therapy in the developing world is evi-
denced by its very willingness to put precious resources behind such projects.
133. The William J. Clinton Foundation's HIV/AIDS Initiative is dedicated to increas-
ing access to ARVs in the developing world. See generally CLINTON FOUNDATION, HIV/
AIDS Initiative, http://www.cintonfoundation.org/cf-pgm-hs-ai-home.htm (last visited
Feb. 28, 2007).
134. Treating AIDS patients without ARVs is inconceivable because "[p] atients receiving
highly active antiretroviral therapy often have undetectable viral loads; transmission is
much less likely when viral burden is low." FARMER, supra note 131, at 91.
135. Id. at 107-08, 114-16.
136. See id. at 113 n.47.
137. Id. at 90.
138. See AVERT, supra note 2 (discussing Thailand's 100% program).
139. See generally Fordham, supra note 25, at 260 (discussing the stigmatization of a
sect of Thai society). This is not to say that the spread and popular understanding of any
disease takes shape in a space free of social meaning and context, but merely to empha-
size that the recent emergence of and strong feelings concerning HIV/AIDS make it a
profoundly cultural phenomenon, differing significantly from one place to another. Id.
140. Id.
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course of action in Haiti.14' Finding a way to pay for such an initia-
tive is an altogether more complicated proposition.
One way to reduce drug costs dramatically is to opt for generic
versions.'42 Bowing to the time-sensitive nature of the AIDS threat
and the impossibility of meeting the costs that would be involved in
attempting to medicate the country's entire population of AIDS pa-
tients4 3 with costly ARVs, Brazil in 2001 announced that it was going
to violate the Swiss drug company Roche's patent on a vital AIDS
medicine"4 and produce a generic version on its own.'45 Needless to
say, pharmaceutical companies, which invest heavily in the research
processes undergirding new drug development,'46 have been less than
receptive to the idea of developing nations exercising this option.'47
In response to the growing crisis prompted by developing coun-
tries' inability to purchase sufficient supplies of ARVs at market
141. See CLINTON FOUNDATION, supra note 133.
142. For example, a generic Brazilian version of the AIDS drug AZT can be obtained
for ninety-four percent less than its main-brand counterpart. Brazilian Generic ARVDrugs
in South Africa - The Background, MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES, Jan. 29, 2002, http:/
www.accessmed-msf.org.
143. At the time of the announcement, Brazil had an estimated 200,000 people living
with AIDS, the highest rate in Latin America. Brazil to Break Aids Patent, BBC NEWS,
Aug. 23,2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2hiIbusiness/1505163.stm. Of these, roughly a quarter
used the drug in question. Id.
144. Nelfinavir, sold under the trade name Viracept, is a protease inhibitor, meaning
that it slows down the replication of the HIV virus in the body by blocking a protein
(protease) necessary to this process. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
AIDSInfo: Nelfinavir, http'//aidsinfo.nih.gov/DrugsNew/DrugDetailNT.aspx?intid=0263
(last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
145. BBC NEWS, supra note 143. This move came under the aegis of a Brazilian law that
allowed the government to break Roche's patent on the grounds that Roche was a foreign
company, selling its product in Brazil and had failed to begin producing the product in
Brazil within three years. Id. The United States had challenged the legality of this pro-
vision at the World Trade Organization but abandoned its protest just before the WTO
set out limited conditions under which drug patent infringement by developing nations
is acceptable. See Press Release, World Trade Organization, Decision Removes Final Patent
Obstacle to Cheap Drug Imports, Aug. 30, 2003, http://www.wto.orglenglishlnews-e/pres03
_e/pr350_e.htm.
146. According to the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, the average
cost of developing a new prescription drug is $802 million. Tufts Center for the Study of
Drug Development Pegs Cost of a New Prescription Medicine at $802 Million, TUFTS
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEv., Nov. 30, 2001, http://csdd.tufts.edu/NewsEvents/
RecentNews.asp?newsid=6.
147. In July 2005, Brazil announced its intention to break another company's (Abbott
Laboratories) patent on the ARV Kaletra. Phil Morrow, In Showdown with Brazil Over
AIDS Drug Patent, Abbott Blinks First, BRAZZIL MAG., July 25, 2005, available at http://
www.brazzil.com/content/view/9353/79/. Abbott was forced to negotiate, and an agreement
was reached whereby the drug would be sold at approximately half its original price.
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, Daily HIV/AIDS Report: Brazil, Abbott Reach Deal to Lower
Price on Antiretroviral Drug Kaletra, http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily-reports/rep
_index.cfm?DR_ID=33054 (last visited Feb. 28, 2007). Abbott fought hard to keep its patent
from transferring automatically to the Brazilian government. Id.
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prices, the World Trade Organization in 2003 established conditions
under which compulsory licensing, a euphemism for patent infringe-
ment, is tolerated. 148 This compromise represents Thailand's best
hope for medicating as many of its infected citizens as possible.
49
Taking advantage of this patent infringement exception and obtain-
ing compulsorily licensed ARVs5 ° must be the next step in Thailand's
AIDS-fighting strategy.1
5
'
An important, and heartening, lesson to be drawn from the Thai
case is that HIV/AIDS is not the unstoppable juggernaut the world
once feared.'52 The United States and other wealthy nations have had
a considerable degree of success in retarding the spread of the virus,
153
but the Thai example proves that with careful planning, adequate re-
sources, and a high level of official commitment and oversight,'54 the
148. See Press Release, World Trade Organization, supra note 145. These conditions
are intended in part to provide a modicum of protection for the patentee's intellectual
property rights, and the main points can be summarized as follows: (1) the country in need
is to produce only as much of the drug as it actually needs to confront its emergency, (2)
the patentee must be timely notified and given an opportunity to negotiate a new price
or make donations, (3) the patentee must be compensated at some level, and, importantly
for countries like Thailand, (4) the country can import a generic version of the drug if it
lacks facilities for domestic production. Elizabeth Durham, Holding Patents Hostage?:
The Need for HIV/AIDS Drugs in Poor Countries Threatens the Health of International
Patent Protection, BAKER BoTs INTELL. PROP. REP. httpJ/www.bakerbotts.com/file_upload/
DuhamArticle2.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
149. Although drug companies cannot be expected to suffer patent infringements gladly,
the WTO result is closely tailored to the specifics of the global AIDS crisis and poses
little threat to drug companies' profit margins, as developing nations were buying few
of their products in the first place. Id.
150. Drugs that prevent the mother-to-child transmission of the virus (notably the ARV
Nevirapine) will be especially important in halting its spread from one generation to the
next. AVERT, Preventing Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV, http://www.avert.org/
motherchild.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
151. Paradoxically, the success of the 1991 strategy may be harming Thailand's abil-
ity to question its assumptions about the best way to fight the disease. See generally
Tangcharoensathien et al., supra note 79, at 805-06. As celebrated and effective as its 100%
condom efforts were, Thailand has been perhaps understandably slow to update its meth-
ods. See generally id. (discussing the need for additional AIDS[HIV prevention strategies).
152. AVERT, supra note 2 (noting the major successes of Thailand's HIV/AIDS
programs).
153. Although there have been disquieting signs of complacency/backsliding due in
part to knowledge of ARVs' ability to extend patients' periods of good health. Warning
Over AIDS Complacency, BBC NEWS, June 25, 2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
health1406793.stm.
154. As important as the monitoring element of the 100% condom campaign proved
to be, such a task would be much more difficult and cost-intensive in a large-scale ARV
treatment program. Ensuring that patients comply with necessarily strict ARV treat-
ment regimens is a formidable task even in the near-ideal conditions present in rich world
clinical trials. See The World Bank's Global HIV/AIDS Program of Action, supra note
95, at 21. Doing so in the conditions present in a developing nation, especially in the rural
settings increasingly at risk for exposure from returning FSWs, seems likely to prove
considerably more difficult.
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developing world need be no different.'55 It is thus worthwhile to con-
sider which elements of the Thai program were most effective and
which could potentially be used with success in other settings.
The linchpin of the Thai strategy was its unrelenting focus on
public educational efforts and a simple, effective message: use con-
doms.156 In dealing with a preventable disease like AIDS, the broad
dissemination of accurate and practically useful information is crucial.
The case of the virus in sub-Saharan Africa provides a tragic ex-
ample 157 of how quickly and thoroughly AIDS can take hold of a popu-
lation when there is a widespread lack of awareness about the disease
and how it spreads.' Because its spread is preventable given a prop-
erly informed population, HIV requires an information vacuum in
which to thrive. 59 Media blitzes like that initiated by the Thai govern-
ment 6 ° are a highly effective way of preventing such a vacuum.
In 1991, Thailand had an infrastructure and communications
network in place that allowed it to put its message on general release
with confidence that it would reach most of the people it needed to
reach. 1 ' Such will not necessarily be the case in other parts of the
world, where mass media have achieved limited penetration. 62 In the
absence of effective means of mass communication, the prevention
and treatment message will have to be carried around developing
counties on foot by NGO-affiliated and other public health workers.
Most of the funding for these activities will come from the World
155. Of course, getting all of these factors to align as they did in Thailand is more easily
said than done.
156. See Hanenberg, supra note 66.
157. In 2005, an estimated 13.3% of all South African women were HIV-positive; in a
troubling sign of worse rates to come, 29.5% of all South African women who visited
antenatal clinics also tested positive. AVERT, South African HIV/AIDS Statistics, http://
www.avert.org/safricastats.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
158. Univ. of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics, HIV/AIDS: Myths and Misconceptions, http://
uihealthcare.com/topics/hivinfectionsaidsfhivi4616.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
159. If people understand nothing more than the fact that having protected sex and
avoiding intravenous drugs will more than likely keep them safe from the virus, they can
alter their behavior accordingly and deny the virus room to spread. See generally id.
160. Among other measures, the Thai government saw to it that "[ainti-AIDS messages
aired every hour on the country's 488 [state-owned] radio stations and six television net-
works, and every school was required to teach AIDS education classes." AVERT, supra
note 2.
161. See id.
162. Mobilising Radio for HIV Prevention in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities,
INTERNATIONAL AIDS SOCIETY, July 2002, http://ww2.aegis.org/conferences/iacd2002/
ThPeF8002.html.
Across Africa, the radio is the primary communication medium for reaching
to the largest segment of the population. The radio is a constant presence
on the streets, in homes, market places and workplaces. Radio is also cross-
cutting in its penetration, serving divergent populations.
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Bank.16 3 That being the case, an examination of the World Bank's
plan to combat the spread of AIDS should provide a good indication
of what global prevention and treatment efforts will look like.
16 1
In its 2005 Program of Action, the World Bank declared that
"[pireventing new infections should still remain the highest priority
for all countries - at all prevalence levels."'65 While acknowledging
the value and effectiveness of ARV therapy,'66 the program points out
the myriad obstacles to its widespread implementation in the near
future167 and reasons that aggressive prevention strategies are the
most practical long-term option. 68 Keeping people from becoming pa-
tients in the first place is certainly a worthy goal, and it is the appro-
priate AIDS policy centerpiece in situations where the virus has yet
to take a firm hold.'69 With AIDS as entrenched as it is, 7 ° however,
it seems that just as much attention ought to be paid to treating those
living with the disease, to both prolong individuals' lives and to en-
sure that hard-hit countries do not see their working-age populations
wiped out.
This is not to say that the Bank's proposal ignores treatment
options, or dismisses treatment of existing cases as of secondary im-
portance. Indeed, the opposite is true: in light of the remarkable re-
sults from their use in Brazil,'7 ' the Program announces the Bank's
intention to provide ARVs to developing nations at the greatly reduced
prices bargained for by the William J. Clinton Foundation.'72 It just
163. "By June 2004, the World Bank had committed US $2.46 billion in credits, grants
and loans to 62 low- and middle-income countries for 106 projects to prevent, treat and
reduce the impact of HIV and AIDS. About US $1 billion of this sum had already been
disbursed." AVERT, Funding the Fight Against AIDS, at http://www.avert.org/aidsmoney
.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007) (citations omitted). This level of financial commitment
makes the World Bank the largest source of funding for prevention work in developing
nations. Id.
164. See id. (discussing the work done by the World Bank).
165. The World Bank's Global HI V/AIDS Program of Action, supra note 95, at 3.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 3, 20-21.
168. 'The more successful countries are at preventing new infections, the more feasible
they will find it to provide treatment and care to those who are infected." Id. at 3.
169. Thailand's experience is particularly on point, as World Bank President Paul
Wolfowitz acknowledges in his Foreword, calling Thailand's case a "significant vic-
tor[y] ... in turning back the disease." Id. at v.
170. The World Bank estimates that forty million people are currently living with
AIDS, and that twenty million have died from AIDS-related causes. The World Bank's
Global HIV/AIDS Program of Action, supra note 95, at 8.
171. "[U]niversal access to ART [anti-retroviral therapy] in Brazil has, since 1996, en-
abled the country to avert more than 60,000 new cases of AIDS and 90,000 HIV-related
deaths." Id. at 20. This policy was made possible by Brazil's willingness to take an uncom-
promising stance in a series of high-profile patent-related clashes with pharmaceutical
companies. See supra notes 142-48.
172. The World Bank's Global HIV/AIDS Program of Action, supra note 95, at 21. For
details of the Clinton Foundation's work in negotiating the pricing structures of ARV
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seems that recognition of the fact that forty million people are already
infected 73 would lead to treatment plans being given a more promi-
nent role in the scheme.
The Bank makes clear its intention to remain one of the main
global financiers of AIDS-related work'74 and to use "its flexibility to
fund countries and activities that others cannot or will not finance." '175
This professed willingness to step into the breach gives the impres-
sion that the Bank seeks to transcend political considerations and
allocate funds where they will be most effective, irrespective of those
considerations. The Bank's status as a multilateral organization frees
it to some extent from the policy objectives of its contributors,176 but
the Program cites, as an example of the challenges the Bank faces,
a "social, political and legal climate [that in developing countries] is
often inimical to effective AIDS programming."'77 Examples of this cli-
mate are official hostility to proposed needle exchange programs and
to the promotion of condom use among FSWs and men who have sex
therapy for developing nations, see Partnership with International Dispensary Association
To Expand AIDS Care and Treatment, July 14, 2004, http://www.clintonfoundation.org/
071404-nr-cf-hs-ai-pr-clinton-foundation-partners-with-international-dispensary-
association.htm. Under the agreement, one line of common AIDS medications "will cost
$140/person/year, one-third to one-half of the lowest price otherwise available in most
settings." Id.
173. The World Bank's Global HIV/AIDS Program of Action, supra note 95, at 8.
174. Id. at 5.
175. Id.
176. AVERT, Funding the Fight Against AIDS, supra note 163. After naming the World
Bank as one of the multilateral institutions responsible for the provision of AIDS funding,
the author notes:
These large organisations are able to make their decisions - some more
than others - fairly independently of the countries who provide their funds.
This means that they can direct funding to countries and projects that might
otherwise be ignored by national government or private funders for political
reasons or other prejudices. For example, PEPFAR is reluctant to direct AIDS
funding to any government that the USA sees as connected to terrorism -
although some countries that are so labelled would benefit from HIV-specific
donations.
Id. The World Bank explains its fund-raising activities in a way that makes the organi-
zation sound like a mutual fund:
We raise money in several different ways to support the low interest and no
interest loans (credits) and grants that the World Bank (IBRD and IDA) offers
to developing and poor countries. IBRD lending to developing countries is
primarily financed by selling AAA-rated bonds in the world's financial mar-
kets. IBRD bonds are purchased by a wide range of private and institutional
investors in North America, Europe and Asia.
World Bank, Frequently Asked Questions, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITEfEXTERNAIJ
EXTSITETOOLS/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
177. The World Bank's Global HIV/AIDS Program of Action, supra note 95, at 2 (em-
phasis omitted).
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with men. 7 ' Although the direct reference here is to the developing
countries in which the Bank carries out its work, the fact that hos-
tility to such initiatives is described as an obstacle can be read as a
subtle critique of the United States's funding practices.'79 If the Bank
were to air this criticism in a more public forum and in more explicit
terms, pressure might begin to build on the United States to base its
AIDS funding decisions on effectiveness rather than ideology."0 As
the organization best placed to analyze need and make projections
of programs' effectiveness in the absence of political accountability
to an electorate,'81 the World Bank should call on the major donor na-
tions to pool their financial resources and allow the Bank to allocate
the funds. As the Thai example demonstrated, only by setting politi-
cal considerations aside can HIV/AIDS be fought effectively.'82
CONCLUSION
In 1990 an observer would have had every reason to think that
Thailand, with its massive and well-patronized commercial sex in-
dustry, would shortly become the global nerve center for the trans-
mission of HIV. "3 The Thai government's response, however, was as
effective as it was radical: by subordinating domestic policy (specifi-
cally enforcement of the ban on prostitution)84 to the pressing public
health need to educate its citizens and help them prevent HIV trans-
mission, the strategy achieved surprising results. 185 As effective as
178. Id. at 2-3.
179. Under the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), thirty-three
percent of United States AIDS prevention funds are allocated to programs taking an
abstinence-only approach. AVERT, supra note 161. Moreover,
PEPFAR also refuses to fund projects and organisations that do not oppose
the legalisation of prostitution, and allows faith-based organisations to refuse
to provide information about proven methods of protection against HIV/AIDS
(condoms) or to refuse to make referrals to clinics or organisations that offer
critical prevention services and information.
Id.
180. The benefits of abstinence-only programs remain speculative at best. See Doctors
Denounce Abstinence-Only Education, MSNBC, July 5, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id18470845/.
181. See generally, World Bank, About Us, www.worldbank.org; 10 Things You Never
Knew About the World Bank, WORLD BANK, 6, available at http://digitalmedia.worldbank
.org/tenthings/en/lOthings-en.pdf.
182. The Thai government's decision to temporarily ignore the illegality of prostitution
in favor of educating FSWs and encouraging them to use condoms was a critical element
in the program's effectiveness. See supra text accompanying note 66.
183. See Rho-Ng, supra note 27, at 112-13. The menacing spike in HIV infection rates
among FSWs in 1989 lent credence to this forecast. Abdel-Monem, supra note 12, at 384.
184. See Rho-Ng, supra note 27, at 119; Hanenberg, supra note 66.
185. Hanenberg, supra note 66.
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the program proved to be, however, there is reason to think it is no
longer having the impact it once did.186 The Thai anti-HIV strategy
is in need of modification not because of some fundamental flaw but
because of the changing nature of the threat to which it is meant to
respond.8 7 Focusing prevention efforts on a discrete segment of the
population is unfortunately no longer an option: the disease has
spread beyond "high risk" groups and into the general population.
Finding a way to reach these people with a coherent and persuasive
prevention message, as well as effective treatments, is the next chal-
lenge facing the Thai government and multilateral organizations
like the World Bank.
As an indication of what the global anti-HIV community has
learned and where its future efforts will be directed, the World Bank's
Global HIV/AIDS Program of Action188 demonstrates that the strate-
gic and logistical components of prevention and treatment are much
better understood than they have been in the past.'89 The Thai tri-
umph of the 1990s was the product of an especially fortuitous com-
bination of factors, 19° and to expect comparable results elsewhere is
likely to result in disappointment.
As the scientific community works toward developing a cure,
there are a few important lessons to keep in mind from the Thai
fight against HIV. The first is that condoms are an indispensable
component of an effective prevention and containment strategy.191
As a corollary, abstinence-only sexual education is not a viable sub-
stitute and should be phased out wherever possible.'92 The second
main point, drawn from more recent developments in Thailand, is
that members of "high risk" populations often have sex with mem-
bers of otherwise 'low risk" populations,193 and prevention messages
must be targeted beyond the traditional high-risk groups.' The
final point, and perhaps the most problematic given the financial and
186. Beyrer, supra note 9, at 218.
187. See Kongsin in LINGE AND PORTER, supra note 94.
188. The World Bank's Global HIV/AIDS Program of Action, supra note 95.
189. See id. at 49 (charting the Bank's goals and specific actions needed to carry them
out). The document's focus is on prevention, but its recognition of the effectiveness of and
expanding need for ARV treatment is worth noting. See supra text accompanying note 168.
190. The Thai success was the product of a well-financed multimedia public-education
campaign, undertaken in tandem with an extravagantly-funded condom distribution and
brothel monitoring scheme (brothels were still the primary locus of commercial sex activ-
ity, which no longer appears to be the case). See supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
191. Nelson, supra note 88, at 814.
192. See MSNBC, supra note 180.
193. Nelson, supra note 88, at 814. See AVERT, supra note 2.
194. Id.
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intellectual property issues implicated, is that ARV therapy must
play an increasingly prominent role if the effect of AIDS on society
is to be contained.'95 Scientific research will hopefully yield a cure
for AIDS in the foreseeable future. Until then, the disease will con-
tinue to kill on a fearsome scale and threaten the fabric of society in
the places hardest hit. The world cannot afford to ignore valuable
lessons like those provided by the Thai case.
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195. The World Bank's Global HIV/AIDS Program of Action, supra note 100, at 21.
Of special importance in stopping the intergenerational spread of AIDS will be drugs like
nevirapine, which help prevent transmission from mother to child. See AVERT, Preventing
Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV, supra note 150.
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